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Abstract
Background: Patient-centered health care information systems (PHSs) enable patients to take control and become knowledgeable
about their own health, preferably in a secure environment. Current and emerging PHSs use either a centralized database,
peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, or distributed ledger technology for PHS deployment. The evolving COVID-19 decentralized
Bluetooth-based tracing systems are examples of disease-centric P2P PHSs. Although using P2P technology for the provision of
PHSs can be flexible, scalable, resilient to a single point of failure, and inexpensive for patients, the use of health information on
P2P networks poses major security issues as users must manage information security largely by themselves.
Objective: This study aims to identify the inherent security issues for PHS deployment in P2P networks and how they can be
overcome. In addition, this study reviews different P2P architectures and proposes a suitable architecture for P2P PHS deployment.
Methods: A systematic literature review was conducted following PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews
and Meta-Analyses) reporting guidelines. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis. We searched the following databases:
IEEE Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Scopus, and Semantic Scholar. The search was conducted
on articles published between 2008 and 2020. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System was used as a guide for rating security
issues.
Results: Our findings are consolidated into 8 key security issues associated with PHS implementation and deployment on P2P
networks and 7 factors promoting them. Moreover, we propose a suitable architecture for P2P PHSs and guidelines for the
provision of PHSs while maintaining information security.
Conclusions: Despite the clear advantages of P2P PHSs, the absence of centralized controls and inconsistent views of the
network on some P2P systems have profound adverse impacts in terms of security. The security issues identified in this study
need to be addressed to increase patients’ intention to use PHSs on P2P networks by making them safe to use.
(J Med Internet Res 2021;23(11):e24460) doi: 10.2196/24460
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Patients require access to their health information with the same
ease as with other web-based activities such as banking or
shopping; however, patients are often only one part of the
current health care processes and not the focus of attention [1].
Such limitations of traditional health care processes, widespread
individual adoption of digital systems, and advancements in
health care practice create a growing demand for
patient-centered health care information systems (PHSs). PHSs
are scalable information systems that leverage information
technology to support patients in managing and taking an active
role in their own health [1,2]. PHSs are not designed to replace
traditional health care information systems, such as electronic
health records, but rather to complement them [3] by offering
additional functionalities, such as translation of clinical
information into layman’s terms [4], provision of information
on medications a patient is taking [2,5], or provision of vetted
information to support self-administered interventions (eg,
reduce weight or quit smoking) [4].
The diversity and flexibility of PHSs enable them to provide
any functionality that patients find helpful [2], including
maintaining personal health records (PHRs) [6], tracking mental
wellness [7], subscribing to risk prediction services for chronic
diseases [6,8], and calculating pregnancy due dates [9]. Patients
are willing to use PHSs, as revealed in a survey of 800 American
patients in which 80% of the patients preferred a patient-centered
approach as they felt excluded in the management of their data
[10]. With PHSs, patients can access their health information
and share it with other stakeholders to co-ordinate their care
[1]. Practitioners can make better clinical decisions based on
instantaneous access to data in PHSs [11]. In patient-centered
health care environments, the value for patients is increased,
health care transaction costs are decreased, patients manage
interactions through the appropriate release of their own data,
and all health care stakeholders will be encouraged to collaborate
with patients and other stakeholders to achieve their goals [1].
Technically, PHSs can be deployed using centralized databases
(eg, Health Bank [12], Microsoft HealthVault [3], and PittPHR
[13]), distributed ledger technology (DLT; eg, Mint Health [14]
and Medicalchain [11]), and more flexible peer-to-peer (P2P)
technology (eg, OnePatient [15] and doc.ai [7]).
The detrimental effects of centralized health information
technology solutions controlled by economic actors are
well-known [16], for example, reluctance to innovate or the
creation of data silos [16]. DLT-based PHSs, such as MedRec,
which is under development at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology [17], are currently spurring the P2P and
decentralization push in the health care domain. However, DLT
is a specialized P2P technology that does not align well with
the needs of the health care sector and the sensitivity of health
information. For instance, DLT systems consume excessive
computation and communication resources by requiring
redundant computations to ensure a consistent state of the ledger
across the network, which makes the logged transactions
available to all nodes participating in the network, and they
have slow processing speeds because multiple parties have to
independently verify transactions and arrive at an agreement
[18]. The mismatch between DLT and the needs of the health
care sector has a simple cause: DLT was primarily designed as
a backbone for cryptocurrencies that require one global
consistent record of transactions and can thrive even in
environments where trusted counterparties do not exist and
might even be malicious [19]. Accordingly, DLT is a P2P
technology that is too rigid for the health care context, where
it is sufficient for all parties involved in the care of a patient to
have a consistent view of a patient’s health status and existing
trust relationships between parties (eg, the patient-physician
relationship) can be leveraged. In this study, we take an
information security perspective and contribute to the emergence
of PHSs that come with the benefits promised by DLT PHSs,
such as decentralization, patient empowerment, and
interoperable health systems [18], but are implemented based
on less rigid and more flexible P2P technology. We refer to
such systems as P2P PHSs.
P2P PHS architectures can be based on hybrid P2P networks
(eg, P2HR [20]), approaches that combine centralized and P2P
architectures (eg, P2P PHR [6] or the e-toile framework in
Switzerland [21]), and highly decentralized networks (eg,
P2P-integrating health care enterprise [P2P IHE; 22]). Other
examples of P2P PHSs, which are disease-centric, are
decentralized systems for Bluetooth-based SARS-CoV-2 (or
COVID-19) contact tracing, for example, Pan-European
Privacy-Preserving-Proximity-Tracing (PEPP-PT) in Europe
[22], Trace-Together in Singapore [23], and Stoop in Austria
[24], which are used to notify people when they are near
SARS-CoV-2 carriers.
In P2P PHSs, the trust and identity of individual participants
do not need to be assured through technology. P2P PHSs provide
PHS functionalities locally (on any patient edge device such as
mobile phones, tablets, etc) under the sovereignty of individual
device owners. Patients can make their health information
directly available to other participants they trust without the
need for any centralized or distributed nodes to facilitate the
transactions. However, P2P PHSs have unique security issues
because patients must manage information security for their
health information largely by themselves, and even qualified
professional administrators are already challenged by the task
[25]. The absence of a central entity to act as a trusted computing
base on P2P networks [25,26] has profound adverse
consequences in terms of security that need to be addressed to
reap the benefits that P2P PHSs promise to offer.
Objectives
P2P PHSs raise challenging information security–related
questions: How can reliable data backups be implemented? If
credentials are lost or compromised, how can they be replaced
or blocked? How well is the system protected against
unauthorized access? P2P PHSs that are not DLT-based (eg,
OnePatient [15] and P2P PHR [6]) are an emerging phenomenon
that will become more relevant in the future as they are aligned
well with large-scale efforts to re-decentralize the internet (eg,
the Solid project by Tim Berners-Lee [27]) and support patients
in taking ownership of their health data [1,10]. Although P2P
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PHSs have been under development for over a decade [21], the
dedicated literature on P2P PHSs is sparse. To date, previous
studies have focused on security, privacy, and end-user features
on centralized and DLT-based PHSs [2,28-31] and did not
address security engineering specifically for P2P PHSs, which
comes with its own challenges due to a different underlying
architecture. To address this gap, this study focuses on security
engineering for P2P PHSs based on a systematic literature
review. We aim to answer the following research question:
Research question: What are the inherent security issues for
PHS deployment on P2P networks and how can they be
overcome?
Security issues are defined as any action that could be used to
disrupt the functionality of the P2P network or enable
unauthorized users to access, modify, or delete user data [32,33],
specifically, due to threats or vulnerabilities, such as malware,
bugs, access control failures, or patients' inadvertent exposure
of their data. To answer the research question, we aim to review
existing P2P and P2P PHS architectures and their design
choices, study existing PHS features, and propose a suitable
architecture for PHS deployment on P2P networks. Thereafter,
we aim to highlight the causes and consequences of existing
security issues in P2P PHSs and evaluate them based on the
identified P2P PHSs in the literature. On the basis of these P2P
PHS architectures, we propose security measures for secure
provision. To overcome the challenges on the path to P2P PHSs,
secure safeguards must be put in place to ensure that information
is securely transmitted and protected against cyberattacks [1,34].
Information security is essential for P2P PHSs and will, if
appropriately implemented and addressed, increase patients'
intention to use P2P PHSs [2,30].
Theoretical Background
P2P PHSs and the Need for Information Security
P2P technology for the provision of PHSs can be flexible and
inexpensive for users because it uses available devices at the
user’s end for deployment. The characteristics of P2P systems,
such as fault tolerance, security and trust, scalability,
availability, self-reconfiguration, and extensibility [35,36],
facilitate and suit the provision of PHSs. With millions of users
worldwide, P2P systems have shown strength in providing
services for sharing resources without the need for a central
server, for streaming multimedia content with distributed load
balancing, for volunteering of computing resources, and for
telephony applications. P2P PHSs, such as OnePatient [15] and
P2P PHR [6], leverage the power of P2P networks and mobile
technology to store health records locally under the control of
device owners, thereby increasing patient empowerment and
control and simplifying the implementation of data protection
principles [8,37,38]. P2P systems have better scalability because
operations can be executed locally and customized for different
purposes. Patients can easily manage access to their health
records by using a single-hop connection (eg, Wi-Fi Direct)
with other trusted parties (eg, a physician) without requiring a
wireless access point or another intermediary communication
network.
Factors that impact the security of centralized PHSs are the
database size, the large number of potentially affected users,
and the confidentiality of the stored data. The health care sector
experiences more data breaches than any other sector [39]. A
breach barometer in the United States reported 503 breaches
for health data in 2018, affecting over 15 million patients [40].
Similarly, the almost immutable nature of data storage in
blockchains makes it nearly impossible for users to erase their
stored (metadata) information, which conflicts with the
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [41].
Table 1 outlines the main advantages and disadvantages of P2P
PHSs.
For patients to benefit from the advantages of P2P PHSs, the
network needs to be robust and fault-tolerant. Information
security is paramount because of the high sensitivity of medical
data [30,42]. Therefore, a pertinent question is how to make
P2P PHSs resilient to attacks. P2P systems communicate over
the internet; therefore, they inherit the same security issues as
any other networked application on the internet. The P2P
architecture poses significant security issues such as index
poisoning attacks [43], Sybil attacks [44], chatty peer attacks
[45], or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [46].
Table 1. Security advantages and disadvantages of peer-to-peer patient-centered health care information systems (P2P PHSs).
DisadvantagesAdvantagesDimension
Inconsistent views in the network allow attackers (and super
users) to cheat and remain undetected.
Patients technically govern data. Patients can define access
rights to their own PHSs.
Privacy management
Patients may lose access when the device is lost, and no
backup system is used by the patient.
Patients keep their medical data and software on their own
devices. Patients can determine the desired redundancy for
their data by backing up at their end.
Federated medical data
Specific security issues other than general networked applica-
tion attacks are introduced and slow deployment of security
patches by users results in insecure P2P systems.
No central attack profiles.Security
Maintenance effort for storing large amounts of data offline
can be high.
Data are available without a network connection, which
improves infrastructure resilience. Disrupted internet con-
nections will not stop data access.
Offline capability
Increased access control requirements for patients are hard to
satisfy with current health care processes and systems due to
bureaucracy and diverse levels of digitalization.
All health care stakeholders requiring access to patient data
have to interact with patients to achieve their goals.
Stakeholder interaction
management
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Moreover, P2P systems increase the attack surface owing to 3
disadvantages [26,47]: (1) increased chances of exposing
network traffic patterns to attackers; even with encryption, the
metadata can still reveal information to external attackers; (2)
an inconsistent view of the network (due to a lack of global
information), which affects integrity by allowing attackers to
cheat and remain undetected; and (3) increased vulnerability to
internal attackers due to the absence of a central entity to detect
malicious insiders and govern software and security updates.
P2P and PHS Networks
Origins
The concept of P2P was introduced in 1969 in the first Request
for Comments of the Internet Engineering Task Force; Request
for Comments-1 denotes a host-to-host connection [48]. UseNet
[49], a distributed messaging system, is often described as the
first true implementation of a P2P network and was established
in 1979. UseNet looks like a client server model from users'
point of view. However, servers communicate with each other
based on the concept of P2P and share content over the entire
group of UseNet servers without a central entity. With the surge
in popularity of P2P networks, the music and file-sharing P2P
application Napster [50] was introduced in 1999, which
exhibited some approaches to P2P networks known today. Later,
well-known and popular P2P systems emerged, such as Gnutella,
eDonkey, and BitTorrent. Within the last 2 decades, the first
health information systems were deployed on P2P networks—for
example, the e-toile P2P PHS framework aimed at connecting
all health care stakeholders in Geneva, Switzerland [21,51];
P2HR [20]; or the PEPP-PT COVID-19 contact tracing system
in Europe [22]. The features distinguishing P2P systems from
centralized systems are peer and resource discovery [35]. Since
there are no servers, peers (eg, patients, practitioners, or PHS
providers) must rely on techniques, such as indexing and routing
tables [52], to locate other peers in the network (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures. Some P2P systems are supported by centralized servers, other P2P systems attempt to decentralize as far
as possible. Between these two extremes, hybrid systems benefit from the properties of both.
A P2P network, or system, is a type of computer network that
exhibits decentralized control, autonomy, virtualization, and
sharing of computing resources [47,50]. Peers participating in
the network form a P2P network of nodes and are equally
privileged. The network is self-organizing. Peers in the network
make their resources directly available to other peers without
the need for a central entity to facilitate or co-ordinate
transactions [35]—for example, patients can directly exchange
information with practitioners over their P2P PHSs. Peers in a
P2P network can share and download resources. This is in direct
contrast to traditional client-server networks in which
resource-sharing and downloading are performed by distinct
actors (eg, in PHRs such as Google Health or Microsoft Health
Vault).
Centralized
Centralized P2P PHS (eg, P2P PHR [6] and e-toile framework
[21]), and other centralized P2P systems (Napster, SETI@Home,
and BOINC [35,50]) combine the features from client-server
and decentralized architectures. One or more central servers are
used to manage administration, transaction, registration, or
resource discovery. To abide by data protection regulations,
such as the US Federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [6] or the GDPR [34,41], and
related regulations, health or personal information should be
stored separately from centrally managed operational data (eg,
status and metadata of transactions as in P2P PHR [6] or the
list of interoperable PHS providers and health care professionals
and their access rights in the e-toile framework [21]). In the
case of contact tracing systems such as PEPP-PT COVID-19
[22], the central server may be operated by a government or
trusted entity to generate identities and contact graphs. In
centralized P2P PHSs, the resources are indexed by the central
server (Figure 2). Although a client-server approach is used for
resource discovery, the actual communication that facilitates
resource transmission is decentralized [53].
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Figure 2. The centralized peer-to-peer (P2P) system. A peer E sends a message to the central server asking for the desired resource, the server runs a
lookup and determines the peers that contain the queried resource and then sends back the result to the requesting peer E. Once peer E obtained the list
(which consists of peer A and peer F), it establishes a direct connection to the peers.
In centralized P2P PHSs, data protection and security measures
based on regulations such as HIPAA [6] or GDPR [41] can be
enforced and implemented but PHSs may inherit issues from
centralized systems [35], such as vulnerability to insider attacks
and function creep by the entity running the server; reduced
tolerance to avoid single points of failure; and issues with
scalability and robustness. Central servers also become more
likely to cause a bottleneck when the number of peers increases.
Decentralized
In decentralized P2P systems, peers have equal rights and
responsibilities [35,54]. This can be seen in agent-based
co-ordination frameworks proposed for the exchange of
electronic health records between different providers (eg, P2P
IHE [6,51]) or other P2P systems (eg, BitTorrent, Gnutella,
Freenet, Chord, and PAST [35,50]). Each peer shares data that
may only be relevant to queries of other peers. A decentralized
P2P design is a user-based infrastructure because it requires no
specific additional infrastructure and depends solely on the
participating users to share resources (bandwidth and storage)
[26]. In a decentralized P2P system architecture, 2 further
dimensions are important [35]: the network structure and logical
network topology (overlay network).
The network structure of a P2P network can be single-tier or
multitier. In a single-tier network (eg, Gnutella, Freenet, and
PAST [35,50]), loads and functionalities are equally distributed
among the nodes participating in the network. In contrast, the
multitier network has a routing structure with hierarchical layers.
An example of a P2P protocol in this category includes the
Super-peer Architecture and Crescendo System [35].
The logical network topology can be structured or unstructured.
In unstructured P2P networks (eg, FreeNet, Gnutella, and
KaZaA [50]), which exhibit a mesh topology [26], each peer
maintains the list of its neighbors to which it may forward
queries. Hence, in most cases, a peer must search a large fraction
of the network when looking for a desired resource in the
network, as there is no precise mapping between the identifiers
of resources and peers [55]. Messages are continuously
propagated by neighbors in the network [26], which affects the
reliability of message delivery when the network is congested.
This type of P2P system can be unsuitable for PHS deployment,
especially in emergency situations where a patient’s medical
history (located with another remote peer) is urgently needed
for medical care.
To address these problems, structured P2P PHSs such as P2P
IHE [51] and other structured P2P systems (eg, Chord,
Kademlia, Pastry, and CAN [35]) have emerged. In structured
P2P systems, a mapping between peers and data exists, data
placement is under the control of Distributed Hash Tables
(DHTs), and each peer has to maintain routing tables. A DHT
is a hash table containing a key-value lookup function, and the
entire index is equally distributed among participating peers
[55]. The key-value store represents only the metadata of the
participating peers, for example, the mapping (id, ptr) indicates
that a resource with identifier id is located at a peer pointed to
by ptr. The general idea of structured P2P networks is to
minimize the number of peer lookups (eg, by adopting a
key-based routing strategy) to identify and locate a desired
resource in the network [35]. The cost of maintaining the
structured topology is high when participants arbitrarily join
and leave the network.
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The overall issue of decentralized P2P systems is the slow search
for peers offering the desired resources in the network [35], and
freedom to join or leave the network affects availability [20,56].
However, these systems do not have single points of failure and
benefit from other features, such as scalability and robustness
to operational errors. The lack of centralized control is a major
factor contributing to routing difficulties: routing becomes more
complicated with more diverse participating nodes [57], when
massive peer churn is present [58] and when there is a
dependence on nodes that could be malicious [59]. To remedy
this, a shared memory in a distributed tuple space architecture
[60], as used in the P2P PHS agent-based co-ordination
framework P2P IHE [51], can be leveraged. In such an
architecture, a distributed network of tuple centers is used as a
co-ordination framework to facilitate interactions between
various PHS providers and other health care stakeholders [51].
Hybrid
P2HR [20] is an example of a hybrid P2P PHS. Other P2P
systems (eg, BestPeer [35], BestPeer++ [61], or BitTorrent
[62]) eventually relied on this topology. Hybrid P2P
architectures were introduced to address the challenges of
centralized servers in P2P networks and the time required for
resource discovery in decentralized P2P networks [35,54]. They
combine the advantages of both architectures [50], such as
reliable resource discovery and scalability. Although there are
no servers in hybrid P2P systems, peer nodes that have more
resources in terms of storage, computation power, network
connectivity, stability, and uptime can fulfill the role of servers
and assist common peers with resource discovery. These nodes
are referred to as super peers. In hybrid P2P systems, resource
discovery can be performed by querying the super peer (in a
centralized manner) or using decentralized search techniques
[63]. Common peers form the lower layer, while super peers
form the upper layer.
Although super peers share some similar properties with servers
in a centralized P2P network, they are different [35]: (1) a super
peer only acts as a manager for its subset of peers in the
network—it is not as powerful as a server in centralized P2P
networks that oversees the entire network. For PHSs, dividing
patients into groups (eg, per hospital) ensures that patients’data
are only shared with users that require them [64]; (2) a super
peer also participates and acts as a common peer and facilitates
the same operations, such as resource-sharing and downloading.
As an analogy, the relationship of super peers with common
peers is similar to interactions between entities in human society:
for instance, in a hospital, physicians keep more knowledge and
connections with their patients than other personnel. As such,
patients with health issues are expected to ask for help from
physicians, as there is a higher probability that they are able to
handle the problem.
Super peers can act as federated authorities whereby
participating users can affiliate themselves with provider nodes
based on extant trust relationships (eg, friendship or treatment
relationships). Provider nodes are largely independent of each
other; hence, there is a federation of provider nodes. Each
provider is responsible for its common peers; however,
individual provider nodes can collaborate to provide services.
The placement of super peers in a privileged position enhances
the availability of resources, operations, computations, and
performance; however, this also raises issues regarding trust,
privacy, and integrity as super peers regulate services. The
absence of a super peer in the network may affect operations
in the network, thereby reducing the fault tolerance of the P2P
network. In terms of security, nodes operated by providers are
central points of attack (at least for the common peers served
by a particular super peer). As super peers manage subsets of
peers in the network, they are more attractive targets for attacks.
“The main vulnerability of federated systems are such
assumptions that federated service providers (e.g., super-peers)
will largely act honestly” [26].
P2P PHS Architecture
On the basis of the discussion of the different forms of P2P PHS
architectures in the previous section, the combination of multitier
structure and hybrid P2P architecture appears to be most
appropriate for P2P PHSs; therefore, we propose an architecture
with the following abilities (Figure 3): (1) enforcement of data
protection requirements similar to that of HIPAA and semantic
compliance through super peers as central index servers; (2)
registration and identity verification; (3) higher scalability and
availability of resources and lack of single points of failure; (4)
association of patients (tier 5, Figure 3) with their respective
PHS providers (tier 3, Figure 3) and practitioners (tier 4, Figure
3); and (5) faster PHS updates with security patches through
the super peer networks. The P2P PHS network is an overlay
of the modeled hierarchical relationships between the tuple
center and PHS providers, PHS providers and practitioners, and
practitioners and patients.
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Figure 3. Proposed peer-to-peer (P2P) high-level architecture for patient-centered health care information system (PHS). An aggregate relationship
exists between the practitioners and the patients. The patients control the access to their health data, and other entities require patient permission to
access a patient’s medical data, for example, by using tokens as currently being implemented in the MedicalChain PHS project [11].
Large health care IT organizations (eg, the German Healthcare
Technology Infrastructure; HTI [2,65]) are represented at the
top of the hierarchy in the architecture to facilitate certification
of various PHS providers (tier 1, Figure 3). They define and
enforce the implementation of various data regulations,
representation standards, and ontologies (eg, Health Level Seven
and Fast Health care Interoperability Resources [6]) to share
heterogeneous medical records across PHS networks. In the
second tier, a distributed public network of tuple centers (eg,
certified through a national health agency) is provided by trusted
third parties (tier 2, Figure 3). Agent-based systems (as in
centralized P2P PHSs [51]) can be used across P2P networks
with the tuple centers' action-reaction rules for communication
events [51]. Agent co-ordination models can handle services
for data semantics and peer lookup services while serving as
mediums for data sharing between P2P PHS providers, but the
actual inter-PHS communications are performed in a P2P
manner. P2P PHS providers can subscribe to any certified tuple
center. Communication of a PHS provider is limited to
communication with other subscribers to the PHS provider’s
tuple center subscriptions.
PHSs can be provided by any party. In our scenario, we
exemplify hospitals (hyper peers—managers of super peers and
other peers in the network) as PHS providers. The hyper peers
relay requests and responses among all subpeers across multihop
networks. Each hyper peer has its own separate private cloud
server, which stores a digital and secure copy of patient health
records (Figure 3). These records are a replica of the data
available on the patient’s local storage but are only made
available in the hyper peer’s private cloud if a patient subscribed
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to the corresponding additional PHS features (eg, for data
backup, ease of remote data sharing, or emergency access).
Accessibility and availability traits of the stored common peers’
data on the private cloud are in the control of patients through
their local PHS client software. This topology can have 2 issues:
(1) similar records of patients are stored locally on their mobile
devices and the cloud, which appears redundant, but this
redundancy curtails connectivity pitfalls while preserving P2P
PHS features in terms of offline capability, and (2) the cloud
storage can become inaccessible when the local patient PHS
device is lost when the device is used as the source of patient
identity verification and access authorization for cloud storage.
Each hyper peer has multiple health practitioners in the network,
which maintain patients’ public identities (under the control of
DHT [55,66]) for lookup functionality and ease of data access;
therefore, a patient (common peer) can be associated with
multiple practitioners from various hyper peers (practitioner A,
B, C, etc). In such cases, these hyper peers can communicate
via tuple centers. This way patient data stored on a cloud of
hospital B can be accessed by practitioners in hospitals A or C
for diagnosis or treatment, given that the patient grants access
rights. Each common peer on the network (corresponding to a
patient) is modeled on the local PHS and on the hyper peer’s
private cloud server. Common peers can grant access to their
health records to any party through single-hop radio
communication (without involving a third party in the
communication, eg, Wi-Fi direct) or multihop network
communications via the cloud storage of the hyper peers [65].
Other parties, such as researchers looking for data for research
purposes, can obtain read-permissions for patient records by
interacting with the practitioner via the hospitals' private
network, which forwards permission requests to patients.
However, only aggregated results (anonymized) are returned
to the researcher. Moreover, wearable mobile devices and
biotechnologies that provide biometric or psychometric data
can also be directly connected to a patient’s P2P PHS.
Methods
Literature Search
We conducted a systematic literature review (Figure 4)
following the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) reporting guidelines
[67,68] and used thematic analysis to guide the data analysis
process [69]. The systematic literature search in this study was
conducted using specialized academic search engines (IEEE
Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library,
Scopus, and Semantic Scholar; see Multimedia Appendix 1 for
further details). The search was conducted on articles published
between 2008 and 2020. The study selection was organized into
the following phases.
1. The search string was derived by breaking down the
research question into different facets, where their
alternative definitions and acronyms are included and
combined using the logical operators “OR” or “AND” [68].
The search string “(P2P OR Peer-to-Peer) AND
(vulnerabilities OR vulnerability OR threats OR threat)”
was applied to the title and abstract and adapted to the
specific syntax of the used search engines.
2. Eligibility criteria: we included all articles that could be
accessed, were written in English, were published in
academic outlets, and identified inherent security issues for
PHS deployment on P2P networks, as suggested for
thematic analysis [69].
3. Abstracts of the filtered articles were further analyzed by
the authors to remove irrelevant articles based on eligibility
criteria and other false-positive results.
4. Articles were grouped and duplicates were removed.
5. The remaining articles were read in full text and analyzed
by the authors (assisted by Atlas.ti software [70] to manage
codes and themes for thematic analysis [69]) to include
only relevant studies based on the eligibility criteria defined
in step 2.
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Figure 4. PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) flow diagram. P2P: peer-to-peer.
Identified Articles
Initially, 102,851 articles were identified using the search string.
The filtered articles were screened based on their titles using
the same search strings. A total of 99.29% (102,121/102,851)
false-positive results were removed. Further examination of the
abstracts of the remaining 0.71% (730/102,121) articles resulted
in the exclusion of 0.67% (685/102,121) articles. The main
reason for exclusion in this step was a lack of thematic fit with
our study (eg, a focus on P2P currency exchange or lending
platforms or security issues for largely unrelated technologies
such as robotics). We analyzed the full text of the remaining
0.04% (45/102,121) articles, and 0.01% (7/102,121) further
articles were excluded. We complemented the result set with
0.01% (11/102,121) additional articles that met the eligibility
criteria but not the inclusion criteria (eg, published before 2008).
Ultimately, 0.05% (49/102,121) articles remained.
Thematic Analysis
Data analysis was guided by thematic analysis [69] to identify
the relevant themes in the identified articles. The initial coding
was performed by the first author and refined and finalized in
group discussions with the other authors. The themes (codes)
were identified using the key security goals (theory-driven)
from the CIA (ie, confidentiality, integrity, and availability)
triad as organizing codes for data analysis (assisted by Atlas.ti
software [70] to manage codes and themes for the thematic
analysis). Confidentiality entails that unauthorized actors cannot
access information during transmission, processing, or in
storage. Integrity requires that the information not be modified
unintentionally or without authorization. Availability means
that the system is accessible to the user when needed. For each
of the codes identified, we looked at the impact of the security
issues associated with the codes to examine their impact on P2P
PHS (eg, potential for unauthorized access). We then
investigated and rated the consequences of potential exploits
of P2P-PHS security issues based on the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS; see Multimedia Appendix 2 for further
details).
The systematic literature review revealed 8 main P2P security
issues (list of themes) extracted through data analysis and 7
factors promoting them. Table 2 shows the summary—generated
codebook—of the security themes identified along with their
sources and exemplary codes used to derive the themes during
the thematic analysis process.
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Table 2. Overview of peer-to-peer security themes identifieda.
StudyCombined themes, second-order themes, and first-order themes
[71-81]Pollution
Metadata pollution • Changing original file name or extension
• Replacing the file with a misleading one
Index pollution • Claims ownership of wanted but bogus content
• Sharing of the content record via the index
Content pollution • Modifying the file content
• Replacing the file with an incorrect one
[78,81-91]Malware
Virus • Infection of the system
• Appears to be part of legitimate programs
Spyware or ransomware • Spying or stealing user data
• Encrypts any kinds of files and data
Worm • Infection of P2Pb routing table
• Appears independent of existing programs
[35,80,82,92-95]Social engineering
Baiting • Tricks user to divulge sensitive information
• Relies on human error or mistakes
Phishing • Scam via email or SMS text messages
• Trick into divulging sensitive information
[35,43,45,47,56,71,73,77,81,89,95-102]Poisoning the network
Index poisoning • Sharing of bogus contents via indexing table
• Affects network quality of service
Routing table poisoning • Sharing of bogus contents via routing table
• Prevents from finding correct resources
[26,52,54,56,63,72,76,81,84,92,103-112]Sybil
Faking identity • Faking multiple identities for a single user
• Affects the redundancy property of P2P systems
51% attack • Outvoting of honest nodes in the network
• Cheating without being detected
[47,54,56,72,77,79,81,92,93,105-108,113-116]Eclipse
Large man-in-the-middle • Separating the network into several portions
• Acts as gateway and disrupts message flow
[43,45,72,76,77,80,81,84,88,92,94,95,97,98,100,102,105,110,117-119]DDoSc
Flooding • Invalid packets flood the network
• Impedes delivery of normal packets
TCP-DDoSd • Connection overload with full TCP-requests
• Denies connections from legitimate requests
[46,100,120-122]P2P traffic blockade
Port number blockade • Blocking of P2P network traffic
• Imposes bandwidth limits with P2P networks
aThe first- and second-order themes are only examples and not exhaustively listed.
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dTCP-DDoS: transmission control protocol–distributed denial-of-service.
Results
Factors Promoting Security Issues in P2P Networks
To use a P2P network for resource-sharing,
multimedia-streaming, distributed-computing, or telephony
applications, users install a P2P application on their device and
permit the application to access and use device resources such
as cameras, microphones, or device storage. In P2P operation,
the P2P client application reads files from the user’s disc during
the uploads and writes to the user’s disc during download.
During this operation, personal or sensitive information can be
transmitted to the network.
Inadvertent Sensitive Information Disclosure
It is often not necessary that users’ confidential or personal
documents be exposed by worms or viruses, as many users
inadvertently expose these documents [123]. For example, a
node may request data X from the user, and the user sends back
the entire folder where data X is located. The user may end up
exposing all of their sensitive information for the following
reasons: (1) a user does not appropriately select or share the
requested data, (2) the interface design of the P2P application
confuses the user, and (3) the requester offers a huge incentive
to share. In 2012, an automated personal health information
tool was used to crawl different P2P networks (FastTrack,
Gnutella, and eD2K) to analyze Canadians’ personal health
information and personally identifiable information in the
exchanged text files [83]. Out of the 3924 P2P files with
unknown content, 1.45% (57/3924) of files were flagged as
personally identifiable information. Manual analysis of the 57
files revealed that 19% (11/57) contained health information
about an identifiable individual, that is, inadvertently disclosed
health information.
In 2019, a survey identified human errors, such as sending
personal information to unintended email recipients or releasing
personal information by accident, as the largest source of data
breaches in the health sector [39]. Similarly, several peers were
found to be inadvertently sharing their financial, email, and web
cache data in a study on the KaZaA P2P network [124]. In
addition, some P2P users share their personal information
intentionally to increase the number of files shared on the
network to meet the participation requirements of some P2P
systems [85].
Set-and-Forget
P2P clients tend to be set-and-forget applications that run in the
background [85,123,125]. This means that the user is not
cautiously tracking the activities of the P2P client, which
increases the opportunity for abuse.
No Borders
Geography is largely irrelevant in P2P networks [85], and no
region is safer than the other. A computer in Australia or
Argentina becomes part of the same network as a computer in
Nigeria (Figure 5). In open P2P networks, files can undoubtedly
migrate globally, and threats can come from any region of the
globe. Hence, the heterogeneity and geographically dispersed
nature of P2P networks can be a problematic factor affecting
security, quality of service guarantees, and scalability. However,
studies have shown that P2P networks converge to a certain
degree of geographical clustering [85,126]. Users may choose
to download and share content from their region to have lower
network use and latency than when downloading or sharing
content outside their region.
Figure 5. Geography example of a peer-to-peer (P2P) network.
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Growing Use and Network Heterogeneity
As a P2P network grows, an increasing number of leaks of
confidential files will occur in the network. In 2017, nearly 27
million P2P users downloaded and shared files on P2P networks
daily, which is 17 million more users than in 2006 [127,128].
Moreover, P2P networks are heterogeneous and fast-moving;
hence, users may not be able to keep track of security issues
and developers may neglect them [85].
No Content Verification
Conventional P2P networks have no trust mechanism to assist
users in deciding whether to share or download content in the
network. Similarly, they have no central authority responsible
for verifying the authenticity of the resources shared by users
[80]. Hence, there is no guarantee that users are sharing the
content they promise. This makes it easier for an attacker to
spread malware across a P2P network, for instance, to conduct
fraudulent activities or pollution attacks [72].
Digital Winds Spreading Files
Typically, P2P networks create file indexes using the names of
the files and the associated metadata [123]. This constitutes a
security issue, as it allows anybody to easily discover files in
P2P networks. For example, an opportunistic search with key
terms related to the top 10 publicly traded health care firms in
the United States revealed 20,000 patient records, 4 patients
with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 201
patients with a mental diagnosis, and 326 patients with cancer
[125]. The approaches that some P2P clients use to create and
manage file names have serious implications in exposing users’
private and confidential information. This can be a problematic
factor regarding security because users’ sensitive files can be
easily discovered owing to poor P2P client design.
Snooping Nodes
This factor enables attackers to leverage the open nature of P2P
networks [100]. The long routing paths across several nodes
create a loophole for malicious activity [94]. Peers in a
privileged position in the network (eg, super peers) are able to
see the communication of other common peers in the network.
For example, decentralized P2P systems such as Gnutella [35]
have no central servers or auxiliary mechanisms to co-ordinate
communication among users, but when a new user connects to
the Gnutella network, it chooses a node as its permanent entry
point [115]. Thus, high-speed nodes are inadvertently placed
in the central part of the topology and can observe the
communication of nodes in their local subgraph. Moreover,
communication in P2P networks stops being anonymous as
soon as the source node establishes a direct connection to a
destination node to download files [35]. The IP addresses of
both nodes are exposed to each other, which creates another
opportunity for abuse. Once the identity of the peer is revealed,
further attacks can be carried out [96].
Identified Security Issues and Their Impact on P2P
PHSs
Pollution
Pollution is a form of attack in which an attacker modifies the
original content (through mixing or substituting) so that it has
no use or is of low quality [72,79,81]. The polluted content
appears to be legitimate content (eg, by having a similar size,
format, and title) to trick users to download it. However, the
altered content may be malicious, fake, or corrupt. This affects
the network’s quality of service (especially in file, voice, and
video-based P2P streaming systems [72,73,75,79,80]), overall
system energy consumption [74], content availability [78], and
data integrity [72]. Pollution is an easy and fast way to
disseminate worms or viruses from one to many peers in the
network. Therefore, pollution can have an exponential impact
on the security of the entire network [72]. The pollution attack
was first discovered in 2005, where a crawler was used to
retrieve super peers in the KaZaA P2P network [73]. Analysis
of the contents collected by the crawler revealed that over 50%
of welcome copies (ie, introductory files for a collection of files)
for musical files in the KaZaA network were polluted [73].
Pollution is a serious attack on P2P networks, even in a scenario
with only one polluter [72,75]. The impact grows when the
number of polluters or peers attempting a request increases [75].
As a result, peers often require multiple times the network
bandwidth they need in a network free from pollution [75].
Furthermore, the attack is persistent. Even if the polluted
contents are identified and blocked by the network, the polluters
may remain alive in the network by disguising their identities
and can keep polluting the network.
Pollution is categorized based on the attackers’ strategy: (1)
metadata pollution, where a file extension or name is modified
and replaced with a misleading one; (2) content pollution, where
the file content is changed; and (3) index pollution, where an
attacker claims ownership of an unindexed bogus file and
uploads its record (IP address, port number, etc) to the entities
(eg, super peers on hybrid P2P) that maintain such records for
distribution [73,77]. In most cases, the polluters also attack
legitimate peers’ reputations or boost their own reputation
through whitewashing attacks [75,76]. Content pollution is the
most popular and common attack in P2P streaming systems
[74]; it was detected in 50%-80% of files in KaZaA and about
50% of popular files in eDonkey [73,74]. Pollution is not
necessarily caused by malicious users; P2P systems are
notorious for illegally sharing and disseminating copyrighted
content, and content is often polluted by copyright owners as a
countermeasure to protect their rights when legal actions fail
[71,72]. To facilitate the protection of copyright claims, some
P2P system providers even weaken protection from pollution
attacks in their network [73], although this affects the confidence
of users in such systems [72,73].
Impact of Pollution Attacks on P2P PHSs
Successful pollution attacks on P2P PHSs can be devastating
because of the higher integrity and availability requirements of
medical data than data shared in other P2P systems. The
consequences of its exploitation could be between low and high,
depending on the level of access gained; pollution attacks often
serve as a gateway to identify vulnerabilities (eg, unverified
inputs that can be used for SQL injection attacks [129]) and
mount further attacks (eg, ransomware attacks). For example,
in 2020, a patient in need of emergency care due to an aneurysm
died in Germany during a ransomware attack in a hospital. The
ransomware attack caused a network outage that disrupted
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emergency services, and the patient was sent to a health care
facility approximately 20 miles away [130]. This diversion
delayed the treatment of the patient by an hour and she died
[130]. The openness of P2P systems allows polluters to easily
join and leave the network [20,56]; however, identity
verification (eg, via insurance, job contract, token, etc) and
multifactor authentication concepts for P2P PHSs could create
an additional layer to reduce the vulnerability of the network.
Patients or practitioners polluting a P2P PHS through their
legitimate accounts can easily be traced; however, in some
situations, a double-faced user (legitimate but malicious) could
leverage open-source hacking tools such as Burp Suite [78] to,
for instance, alter an http request payload with an anonymous
ID, add polluted content, and forward it to the content
distribution network of a hospital to harm the network.
Malware
Malware refers to a wide range of attacks that compromise a
system without the knowledge of the system owner [84,90].
P2P networks present a greater risk for receiving malware; for
example, only 3 strains of malware infected over 68% of
compressed and archived files on the Gnutella network [84]. In
the first 3 quarters of 2019, 7.2 billion malware attacks were
reported globally [91]. In P2P networks, malware is
predominantly used to create botnets by leveraging worms
[84,89,90].
A botnet is a network of infected nodes that are usually
compromised by worms or viruses. Individual bots in the botnet
only use a small portion of the infected resource to remain
concealed and create only barely noticeable traffic to share data
from the compromised computers with the target [88,89]. The
bots are controlled by an attacker (botmaster) through
command-and-control servers [89].
A worm is independent and neither requires a host application
[84,87,92] nor human intervention [82] to propagate and
replicate itself over a network. Worms can result in a high fallout
in combination with other vulnerabilities and propagate
themselves over email attachments, web server infections, file
downloads (counterfeit worms), or other legitimate network
activities (silent worms) [78,81,82,84,87]. Passive (counterfeit
and silent worms) and active worms are 2 broader categories
of P2P worms; they both propagate like a biological virus, but
the former waits for victims to infect, while the latter actively
searches for new targets [84]. The threats to the amplification
of worm-based attacks in a P2P network are high, and the impact
grows based on network size, topology degree, or host
vulnerability [78]. In contrast to the internet, where worms need
to randomly search to identify vulnerable hosts, P2P worms
spread rapidly and infect all nodes in the network almost
instantaneously [84]. For example, the Antinny (passive and
counterfeit) worm that appeared on the Japan-based Winny P2P
network led to the disclosure of a large amount of private data:
thousands of patient health records, customers’ identifiable
information, top-secret military information, and documents of
a county police investigator, yielding information on major
investigations on 1500 individuals [85,86]. Furthermore, in
2001, in less than 14 hours, the Code-Red worm (active) infected
over 350,000 systems and caused more than US $1.2 billion in
damages in the first 10 days of its circulation [78].
P2P worms are some of the best facilitators of botnet-based
attacks and internet worms. P2P networks are, for instance,
known for sharing gray content, such as pornography and pirated
streaming media. This can lead users to incautiously monitor
unusual behaviors in the network [78,84,85]. Active P2P worms
have different attack strategies: pure random scan (PRS), offline
hit-list scan, and web-based scan [78,82,84]. The PRS is a
starting point, information gathering stage, and is the most
commonly used strategy [78]. PRS is useful when the infected
host (bot) possesses no prior vulnerability information of
potential targets and randomly selects and mounts attacks on
targets to propagate the infection, for instance, using random
IP addresses searched from the global internet address space
[78,82,84]. The offline hit-list scan is a more powerful strategy:
the attacker collects and continuously attacks targets using DNS,
network topology, and routing information of P2P systems (eg,
using crawler tools [83]) until all the hosts in the hit-list are
scanned, and the newly compromised bots attack using the PRS
strategy [78,82]. Instead of an offline hit-list, the web-based
scan strategy primarily launches attacks on its web-based P2P
neighbors, and then the worm disseminates further using PRS
through the infected worm hosts [78,82].
Impact of Malware on P2P PHSs
Ransomware constitutes the biggest threat with 151.9 million
attacks globally in the first 3 quarters of 2019 [91]. Moreover,
ransomware attackers are shifting tactics to target higher-value
institutions, such as hospitals [91]. In 2017, a malware was used
in the WannaCry ransomware attack, which infected more than
230,000 computers worldwide [131]. In the British National
Health Service, WannaCry disrupted scheduled treatments in
many hospitals, resulting in total damages of around £92 (US
$12.6) million in the United Kingdom [132]. The malware
hijacked users’ data, encrypted the data, and blackmailed users
before decrypting their data [133]. For health data on P2P
networks, which have a less controlled infrastructure,
ransomware attacks can become easier.
The effect of malware on P2P PHS could be high, although the
severity of malware attacks is context-dependent. The effect of
malware, such as Antinny [85,86], Anatova [134], or Code-Red
[78], on P2P PHSs will be detrimental if it denies patients and
physicians access to the PHS, steals patient data, or hijacks and
encrypts data for ransom. Structured P2P PHSs, similar to our
proposed architecture (Figure 3) or the e-toile framework in
Switzerland [21], could be less vulnerable to malware in
comparison with unstructured P2P PHSs. This is due to the
possibility of using control measures on the index and DHT
networks [55,66]. The factors that increase the attack surface
include that P2P client applications tend to be set and forget
[85,123,125] so that they run in the background while the user
is not monitoring its activities and that there is no centralized
control to detect and prevent attacks in P2P networks. The
impact of malware could also escalate beyond the boundary of
the P2P network and impede usability features such as
emergency access or guardian support. In P2P PHSs, these
disruptions can occur on a greater scale than in the example in
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the previous section, where a single patient could not be treated
in a hospital because of a ransomware attack [130].
Social Engineering Attack
Some P2P clients are being used by users with limited
knowledge of computers and information security [80,94,95].
Depending on the nature of the target network, the effect of
social engineering attacks—an attack on the users involved in
a system [93]—can facilitate exploits of other vulnerabilities.
P2P worms such as silent worms (eg, VBS.Gnutella worms
[82]) are based on social engineering, disguise themselves,
attach to a known file, and wait to compromise victims [93].
Moreover, some P2P systems (eg, Napster and BitTorrent [92])
implement mechanisms in which the users are incentivized to
share resources or content to gain greater performance and
access to content; therefore, experienced users or attackers can
exploit the eagerness and likely incautiousness of new users to
deceive them and obtain confidential information, which could
be used to conduct malicious attacks. Owing to the
set-and-forget nature of P2P file-sharing applications [35], users
may not realize the breach of confidentiality risks when using
them, which increases the chances of abuse.
Impact of Social Engineering on P2P PHSs
Social engineering can affect all types of P2P PHSs, where an
attacker can easily leverage the user layer to deceive patients
(older adult patients are more vulnerable to this attack than
others [135]). In the case of P2P PHSs, the threat impact could
be one user at a time, with the probability of escalating and
affecting others in the network. Social engineering can be
observed as an intelligent information gathering stage for
attackers to mount other attacks [129], such as scamming
patients to obtain, for instance, access credentials to their P2P
PHS accounts. Depending on the attackers’ goals, they may
modify patients’ health records or upload malware to the P2P
network to affect patients’ lives, health, location, privacy,
behaviors, or activities [93] and sabotage the PHS and its
providers.
Poisoning the Network
Poisoning can be performed either by index poisoning or by
routing table poisoning [102]. Many P2P systems have a lookup
service using indexing or routing table techniques [35,47,95].
A poison attacker can use this to inject invalid information such
as bogus resource identifiers or fake IP addresses into the lookup
service. An index poisoning attack affects the index of P2P
systems [43]. Injecting invalid information in the index or
routing table can slow down the query, prevent others from
finding the correct resources, or result in a peer wasting time
connecting to invalid peers [100,102], which eventually affects
the P2P network’s quality of service [101]. Some anticopyright
infringement organizations use poisoning attacks to prevent the
sharing of pirated content on P2P networks [89,99,100]. These
attacks are performed by identifying and poisoning the IP
addresses of the servers for pirated content or using their IP
addresses as evidence to sue the content server or P2P system
providers [71].
An index maintains records in a centralized manner (eg, Napster
[50], P2P PHR [6], or e-toile framework [21]) and enables users
to locate resource owners’ IP addresses and port numbers. In
index poisoning attacks, the attacker aims to compromise
indexing peers (peers that participate in the indexing) by adding
invalid information into their local indexes by simply sharing
the bogus information with the indexing peer [43,81].
A poison attacker can also attack a specific host; for example,
if the attacker wants to conduct a DDoS attack on the application
server at host 129.13.152.6, the invalid information may include
129.13.152.6 for the IP address and 80 for the port number.
Once the indexing peer has been poisoned, another peer can
search for a resource and eventually receive invalid information
from the poisoned peer and try to download the resource from
the victim host. Before downloading the resource, the
transmission control protocol (TCP) connection is established
with the victim host using invalid information. To download
the resource, the requesting peer sends a message to the desired
resource. When many peers try to download the resource from
the victim host, a TCP-connection DDoS comes into effect
[43,97,98].
Structured P2P systems (eg, P2P IHE [51], our proposed PHS
architecture [Figure 3], Chord, and Kademlia [35]) are
vulnerable to poison attacks [95], although resource discovery
is under the control of data structures (eg, DHT). In routing
table poisoning, the poison attacker exploits the fact that each
peer in a DHT-based P2P system maintains the routing tables
of its neighbors [47,56,73,77,95,96]. Each entry in the table
includes the neighbor’s identifier, IP address, and port number.
The attacker can deceive participating peers by injecting invalid
neighbors into their routing tables. The poisoned peer may
choose an invalid neighbor in its routing table and forward its
messages. If the routing tables of many peers are poisoned with
invalid information and each entry points to the IP address of
the victim host, the target receives a flood of messages from
the DHT [95]. A further type of content pollution attack is a
combination attack that combines index poisoning and
fake-block attacks to have a higher impact [45,77]. In this case,
poison attackers use an index poisoning attack to include their
IDs in the invalid information to be advertised. If the victims
establish the connection through the invalid information, they
may connect to a poison attacker, so that the attacker can feed
the victims with fake fragments and impose more harm on them.
Impact of Poisoning Attacks on P2P PHSs
Centralized P2P PHSs, such as P2P PHR [6] and the e-toile
framework [21], could suffer the worst effects of poison attacks
because they can cause DDoS or entire network failure and
disrupt the services offered by PHSs. For example, in the e-toile
framework [21], a list of health care stakeholders and their
access rights, data exchange, and authentication is managed by
a central index server; poisoning such an index could mean that
the data of a patient registered with PHSX in need of emergency
care at a remote hospital that uses PHSY could be inaccessible
to practitioners. Even if the networks of PHSX and PHSY are
not affected, the single point connecting the PHS providers is
disrupted. Depending on the urgency of a patient’s need for
treatment, the need for access to health data, and the longevity
of the attack, the patient’s health and life could be adversely
affected. In some P2P PHSs (eg, P2P PHR [6] or P2HR [20]),
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peers’ IP addresses are exposed to facilitate health information
exchange between different health entities; this makes the attack
even easier. For our proposed P2P PHS architecture (Figure 3),
there is a federation of PHSs and tuple center providers. Within
the context of the previous scenario, access and data exchange
will not be impacted if PHSY is in the same tuple group as PHSX.
Sybil Attack
The name Sybil attack was coined by Microsoft Research in
2002 based on the book Sybil about a patient, named Sybil,
diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder [111]. In computer
security, Sybils refer to multiple identities of a single user on
the same machine; this user can become powerful and control
a significant part of the network or use the identities to influence
the system behavior [54,56,81,109,110,112]. In DHT-based
P2P systems, a user can locally generate multiple node IDs for
many node instances on the same machine [108]—on the Kad
network, a single node can select multiple IDs concurrently
[107]. The creation of Sybils is considered the most harmful
behavior on a P2P system [54], as it offsets the network’s
redundancy property [81]. Sybil attacks occur in a P2P network,
when the reputation mechanisms are compromised [72], secure
authentication mechanisms are not implemented (eg, no proof
of identification is required for registration in the P2P session
initiation protocol network [106]), or verification of a client’s
IP address and its maximum number of connections per ID is
not implemented (eg, Kad network [98]). Limiting the number
of connections per IP address (eg, in eDonkey [84]) does not
prevent Sybil attacks because attackers can bypass this by having
many virtual IP addresses. It seems that there is no clear and
definite solution to prevent Sybil attacks [26]; this is due to the
openness and lack of admission control mechanisms in P2P
networks.
Sybils are used by attackers to conduct massive and organized
attacks on P2P networks [92]. For example, eclipse attacks [54]
amplify Sybil attacks through the combination of Sybil and ID
assignment or mapping attacks [105], which assigns identifiers
near the same portion of the ID space to sufficient Sybil nodes
(Figure 6). This enables the attacker to own a deciding power
of where in the ID space the new nodes are placed. When the
attacker owns more nodes than the benign nodes in the segment,
the attacker can control messages in the segment, bias reputation
score, create DDoS situations, or force servers to exceed their
CPU capacity [26,76,84], which is also known as a gateway
attack [92]. In blockchain P2P networks, Sybil attacks are, for
instance, used by attackers to outvote the honest nodes in the
network [52,63,104], which enables the attacker to cheat without
being detected. After a successful Sybil attack, attackers can
transmit or discard blocks, effectively block other users from
the network, carry out 51% of attacks to change the order of
transactions, prevent transactions from being confirmed, or even
reverse transactions that they made, which can lead to double
spending [103].
Figure 6. Example of Sybil attack [92]. The attacker placed his malicious nodes on one side of the network segment. Placing many malicious nodes
in the network enables the attacker to gain control of the activities of one-half of the network.
Impact of Sybil Attacks on P2P PHSs
Sybil attacks are helpful for attackers to disguise their identities,
access vital information managed in the PHS index service,
monitor communications between users, steal patient data, or
pollute the entire network to disrupt the entire PHS service
operation, which would affect patients’ health and life and
sabotage the PHS provider's reputation. In our proposed PHS
architecture (Figure 3) or the e-toile framework in Switzerland
[21], the national health IT agencies are tasked with effectively
handling health care stakeholders’ registration, authentication,
and verification; therefore, freedom to create multiple concurrent
IDs on the same system by any malicious user is reduced by
design. P2P PHSs, such as P2P IHE [6,51], could be more
vulnerable to Sybil attacks due to the difficulty in establishing
control mechanisms in a decentralized network. In any case,
attackers can leverage Sybil attacks to steal patients’ identities
(eg, for insurance coverage or blackmail).
Eclipse Attack
An eclipse attack is a large-scale man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attack that is commonly executed at the P2P network level
[54,92]; routing, sniffing, and traffic analysis attacks are variants
[56,79,81,93,105,106,115,116]. An eclipse attack aims to
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separate the entire network into 2 or more partitions (Figure 7)
by placing malicious nodes in a strategic routing path of the
P2P network [105,106,108] to surround benign nodes with
malicious neighbors [77]. In most cases, the routing mechanisms
are attacked [47]. This is accomplished by adding the attackers’
addresses to the neighbor list of the benign nodes [54,81] or
through fake routing updates and incorrect routing [105]. Once
the network is fully segmented with malicious nodes in between
the partitions, the attacker can act as a gateway and disrupt the
information flow between the network partitions, exclude groups
of nodes from the network, or steal peer identities [54,77]. This
affects the reliability, autonomy, and connectivity between peers
and the CIA properties of P2P networks [72,106,114]. In
addition to mounting an eclipse attack by manipulating the
overlay network, an attacker that has collected a significant
number of peer IDs and acts as a neighbor of benign nodes can
easily mount eclipse attacks [54,77,81,107].
Figure 7. Example of an eclipse attack [92]. The attacker successfully segmented the network into 2 ID spaces. The communications between the nodes
in the network must be forwarded by the malicious nodes.
Successful eclipse attacks require attackers to possess a high
proportion of fake nodes in the network and a higher number
of direct routes coming to their nodes than to the average benign
nodes in the network [54,77,81], especially in networks with
relaxed rules for maintaining the routing table [92]. P2P systems
that have no control over node placement in the ID space (eg,
Gnutella [54]) or freedom of choice for identifiers (eg, Kad
[107]) are highly vulnerable to eclipse attacks. P2P networks
are more susceptible to eclipse attacks when they are new [54].
As seen in the Bitcoin network, a botmaster with as few as 24
IP address blocks can eclipse any node with a minimum
probability of 85%, irrespective of the number of nodes in the
network [114]. Despite new security patches that address eclipse
attacks on the Bitcoin network, a novel form of eclipse attack,
EREBUS, was found [113], which partitions the network and
affects Bitcoin nodes' peering decisions. This shows the
likelihood of exploiting eclipses in P2P networks.
Impact of Eclipse Attacks on P2P PHSs
The lack of freedom to select and place identities and the
presence of a control infrastructure in centralized and hybrid
P2P PHS (eg, our proposed architecture [Figure 3] or the e-toile
framework in Switzerland [21]) reduces the impact of any form
of eclipse attack on P2P PHSs. This could be higher for
decentralized P2P PHSs such as P2P IHE [6,51] because of the
absence of centralized trust and control infrastructures and the
presence of eclipse attack vectors such as resource routing
mechanisms in the network [47]. In addition, a successful attack
could allow an attacker to eavesdrop on the conversation
between users in the network without potentially compromising
the patient's system. P2P PHSs on a patient device can be
configured with wearable smart sensors to allow health
practitioners or an embedded machine learning model to monitor
vital parameters (eg, heart rate variability). In the case of a
successful MitM attack on such P2P PHSs, the practitioners or
machine learning models may receive unreliable data, which
could lead to poor therapeutic or diagnostic decisions and even
loss of life [93,135]. An attacker can also share fake messages
that an older adult has fallen in order to summon the next-of-kin
or emergency services or use the patient's location or personal
data for blackmail [93,135].
DDoS Attack
A traditional denial-of-service (DoS) attack stops a service
[92,94]. Query flooding is the most common resource and key
to mounting DoS on P2P networks [77,105,117]. Invalid or
corrupted packets flood the network [95] and impede the
delivery of valid requests or messages in the
network—byzantine attacks [119]—and therefore stop all
communications passing through the affected routes. A DDoS
is said to occur when constant streams of invalid packets flood
the network in such a way that a single node has to deal with
massive traffic and runs out of bandwidth
[43,80,81,92]—bandwidth attacks (Figure 8). A lack of central
authority can be the root cause for DDoS [97], but the root cause
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can also be due to the absence of mechanisms that verify
response messages from other nodes (eg, in Kad [98]). Many
nodes (or zombies controlled by attackers, where each zombie
may control other attacking zombies) participate in DDoS
attacks [81,88], while the source of the attack is hidden behind
a separate layer or through spoofed IP addresses [84,92,105].
This disguise of the attackers makes it difficult to detect them
because they are often only indirectly involved [81].
Figure 8. Example of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack [92]. The attacker successfully executed the DDoS attack and compromised many
nodes in the network. The normal nodes cannot establish connections to other normal nodes.
The previously discussed index and DHT routing table poisoning
attacks and file request redirection (or topology change) attacks
are other methods of mounting DDoS [77,84,98,102,110,118].
A file request redirection attacker (chatty peer) advertises the
possession of many false resources that are rare in the P2P
network and then establishes several TCP connections with the
victims (requesting peers) [45,100,102]. However, if the
requesting peers ask for the blocks of the requesting resource,
the attacker only resends handshake messages to the victims
and never uploads any blocks. This makes the requesting peers
spend much time waiting in vain for the attacker's response and
blocking other legitimate users from making connections to
them. As such, TCP-connection DDoS comes into effect and
affects the availability of entire P2P networks [72]. A
request-redirection DDoS attack on internet equipment was
used to shut down tech giants’ websites (eg, Yahoo and
Amazon) in February 2000 [84], which shows the impact
severity of DDoS on any network.
DDoS is an active attack that makes it more aggressive. An
attacker often attacks the network to prevent certain users from
performing their tasks or put the system out of service in one
or many segments of the underlying infrastructure [76,84]. The
probability of a DDoS attack is high in large P2P networks
because nodes have to be reachable (usually outside of firewalls
restrictions, etc) by the network [92,117]. Depending on the
number of zombies, DDoS on decentralized P2P networks may
barely affect the entire network, except for a certain number of
affected peers. On the contrary, the impact could be higher on
centralized and hybrid systems because communication relies
on a single entity that is reachable throughout the network or
subnetwork. The higher the number and diversity of nodes
involved in the DDoS, the more difficult it is to be blocked
[81,97].
Impact of DDoS on P2P PHSs
When P2P PHS providers are hospitals, as in our proposed
architecture (Figure 3), and store all patients’ medical records,
a successful DDoS attack on the network (index or super peers)
will have severe consequences. The effect could disrupt the
network and data access and cause a delay in treatment and even
loss of life (eg, the case of a patient who died after a malware
hit a hospital in Germany [130]). In some centralized and hybrid
COVID-19 contact tracing systems (eg, PEPP-PT [22] and
Trace-Together [23]), the identifiers (ephemeral IDs) that are
used to share exposure notifications during smartphone
encounters are generated through a central authority (eg, a
hospital) and enough of them are generated in batches, for future
use and for constructing contact graphs of users when they are
infected [136]. A DoS on this server could prevent the IDs and
relevant estimations to reach the targets, and the affected persons
would have a false sense of safety since they are no longer
notified about encountered contacts. In any case, the effect of
DDoS is likely higher in centralized and hybrid P2P PHS than
in decentralized P2P PHSs such as P2P IHE [6,51]. This is
because of the presence of single points that manage other users
in the network. However, centralized control mechanisms also
ease the tracing of attackers and reduce the probability of DDoS
attacks.
P2P Traffic Blockade
In 2008, P2P networks accounted for almost 53% of internet
traffic in Germany, followed by web browsing (26%) and
streaming (7%) [122]. With respect to P2P network traffic,
BitTorrent accounted for 37%, web browsing for 15%, and
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eDonkey for 13% of P2P internet traffic [122]. Given the high
proportion of P2P traffic in most regions, it is not surprising
that a number of internet service providers (ISPs) are using
advanced filtering techniques to impose bandwidth limits and
throttle or block traffic associated with P2P systems, for
instance, by using port numbers, flow features, and deep packet
inspections [46,100,121]. In 2012, the United Kingdom High
Court ordered, for example, some ISPs (eg, O2, Virgin Media,
and TalkTalk) to block BitTorrent P2P traffic owing to its
potential for copyright infringements [120].
Impact of P2P Traffic Blockade on P2P PHSs
The consequence of a P2P traffic blockade on any type of P2P
PHS could be high because the effect could render the system
unavailable over the network, for instance, in a situation where
ISPs realize a high proportion of internet traffic caused by P2P
networks and impose bandwidth limits or block the traffic. If
any P2P PHS user is affected by the blockage, P2P PHSs, for
instance, for remote sharing of medical records or COVID-19
exposure notifications will be disrupted. This can potentially
affect patient health and contribute to virus spread. As a
workaround, users can move to a different region that does not
block traffic because P2P systems are not bound by borders.
The chances of being affected by a P2P traffic blockade when
using a PHS is higher in regions that often use network traffic




Our findings support the idea that P2P system security is a
process rather than a product [33]. Moreover, security
encompasses not only technical issues but also human and
management problems. Therefore, it is highly relevant for the
development and use of P2P PHSs to consider the security issues
in P2P networks and the techniques used to exploit them, the
security requirements to prevent attacks, peculiarities of attacks,
and potential attacker profiles. Our findings are presented in
Tables 3 and 4. Security issues such as malware, social
engineering attacks, eclipse attacks, DDoS attacks, pollution
attacks, and P2P traffic blockades pose high threats (in case of
a successful attack) and have a high probability of being
exploited in P2P PHSs owing to the high number of factors
contributing to their chances of successful exploitation (Table
3); moreover, they can put any P2P PHS out of service, which
can potentially affect patients’ state of health. For illustrative
purposes, we discuss the factors and scores for malware and
eclipse attacks in detail below (refer to the section Identified
Security Issues and Their Impact on P2P PHSs for a detailed
discussion of the security issues).
The effect of any malware type depends on its propagation speed
and power. Malware that compromised a PHS can be
inadvertently spread by the patient (eg, when it is hidden in a
patient’s health records). Other factors promoting security issues
in P2P networks (set-and-forget, no borders, digital winds
spreading files, growing use, and network heterogeneity) and
no content verification (Table 3) can fuel malware propagation
in the network. If attackers compromise super nodes (eg,
practitioners or hospital nodes), they can spread malware even
more easily. A successful malware attack (eg, Antinny [85,86]
or Code-Red [78]) on any P2P PHS can affect the CIA properties
of the network and may cause a delay in treatment or even loss
of life (eg, the case of a patient who died after a malware hit a
hospital in Germany [130]). Malware can attack various network
layers (user, network, or transport layers) to mount DoS attacks,
poison the network, block P2P traffic, or compromise users’
identities or health data.
The severity of malware is low in centralized P2P PHSs (eg,
the e-toile framework in Switzerland [21] or P2P PHR [6]; Table
4) because the central index server can simply be used as a
trusted computing base [25,26] or a point to deploy control
measures to mitigate the propagation of malware in the network.
The severity of malware is medium in hybrid P2P PHSs (eg,
P2HR [20]), our proposed P2P PHS architecture (Figure 3;
Table 4), because there are no central attack profiles, and a
federated data ecosystem multiplies the effort required for
malware attacks by the number of federated subnetworks. The
severity of malware is high in decentralized P2P PHSs (eg, P2P
IHE [51]; Table 4) because of the lack of a trusted computing
base and high responsibility for individual users to maintain
routing information (DHT networks) and security measures
[25,26]. Once the neighbor lists of users are infected by
malware, the malware can spread further (eg, using a PRS
strategy) through the nodes’ subnetworks, which contributes to
the malware's high propagation speed [78,82].
Factors such as use and network heterogeneity, no borders, and
snooping nodes promote the impact of eclipse attacks on P2P
networks (Table 3). In most cases, a successful eclipse attack
allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the conversation between
peers in the network without potentially compromising the
victim's system. This impacts the reliability, autonomy,
connectivity, and CIA properties of P2P networks [72,106,114].
The severity of eclipse attacks is low in centralized P2P PHS
(eg, the e-toile framework in Switzerland [21]; Table 4) because
of the difficulty for users to create multiple fake identities (as
required to mount an eclipse attack [54,77,81]) and the likely
presence of trusted computing infrastructure in centralized P2P
PHSs. Nevertheless, attacks on central index servers (or super
peers in hybrid P2P PHSs) are likely to be able to snoop network
communications. The severity of eclipse attacks is medium in
hybrid and decentralized P2P PHSs (eg, P2P IHE [51]) or our
proposed P2P PHS architecture [Figure 3; Table 4]), as eclipse
attacks require a high number of compromised nodes and are
usually achieved through attacks on routing mechanisms
[47,54,77,81]. Decentralized and hybrid P2P PHSs require
routing mechanisms (eg, DHT) to facilitate health information
exchange and communication between patients and practitioners.
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Table 3. Factors promoting the security issues.





















Table 4. Severity ratings for peer-to-peer patient-centered health care information system security.
Exemplary security measuresSeverity score on P2P PHSaSecurity issues
DecentralizedHybridCentralized
HighMediumLowMalware • Firewall
• Antivirus and antispyware
• Mobile agent–based intrusion detec-
tion system
• Access policies
MediumMediumMediumSocial engineering attack • Education and awareness training
HighMediumLowPoisoning the network • Authentication protocol
• Trust and reputation system
• Access policies
MediumLowLowSybil attack • Authentication protocol
• Trust and reputation system
• End-to-end encryption
MediumMediumLowEclipse attack • Authentication protocol
• Trust and reputation system
• End-to-end encryption
• Access policies
MediumMediumHighDDoSb attack • Firewall
• Mobile agent–based intrusion detec-
tion system
• Bandwidth limitation per node
• Access policies
MediumMediumLowPollution • File and content verification
• Trust and reputation system
• End-to-end encryption
• Removal of polluted content
LowMediumHighP2P traffic blockade • End-to-end encryption
• Encryption of P2P traffic
aP2P PHS: peer-to-peer patient-centered health care information system.
bDDoS: distributed denial-of-service.
J Med Internet Res 2021 | vol. 23 | iss. 11 | e24460 | p. 19https://www.jmir.org/2021/11/e24460
(page number not for citation purposes)
Abdullahi Yari et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH
XSL•FO
RenderX
Protecting P2P PHSs Against Security Issues
Under normal circumstances, patient-physician relationships
are based on trust, and P2P systems generally require trust
between their participants [46]. However, uncertainties regarding
the protection of user data, single points of failure, and the
integrity of the super peers remain. Under our proposed PHS
architecture (Figure 3), a trusted registration authority (eg, the
German HTI or a hospital) is introduced to the network to handle
administrative tasks such as authentication and verification and
can also issue or revoke credentials to users based on their
behavior [30]. End-to-end encryption [137] can be used to
maintain confidentiality in health care information systems [30]
and to reduce the trust required for other network participants.
For instance, the state-of-the-art cryptographic protocol Signal
for end-to-end encryption, which is used by popular instant
messaging apps [138], including WhatsApp, Wire, and Facebook
Messenger, can be used. Security analyses of the Signal protocol
show that it can resist most known attacks [139]. Furthermore,
transparency mechanisms can be used to make it easier to hold
a provider accountable for violating users’ trust [26], for
example, certificate transparency can be managed by a set of
services and neutral auditors to keep track of X.509 certificates
of providers and quickly observe rogue or hacked certificate
authorities. Such security techniques reduce the impact of eclipse
attacks, DDoS attacks, pollution attacks, poisoning attacks, and
P2P traffic blockade on P2P networks [52,81]. For example, an
intercepted message can be rendered useless for eclipse attackers
by encrypting it.
A discussion of all possible security measures (see Table 4 for
examples) for each identified security issue is beyond the scope
of this study. In line with the identified security issues, we focus
on trust and reputation models (TRM), identity authentication
schemes (IAS), and agent-based intrusion detection systems
(IDSs). As an overarching guideline, we extended an extant
guideline for secure provision of PHSs [2] (Figure 9) with 2
additional steps (selection and modeling of security measures
[step 3] and risk assessment [step 6]). The guideline is useful
for supporting individual PHS providers to deal with the
complexity of securing P2P PHSs.
An effective IAS addresses security issues such as Sybil attacks,
poisoning attacks, pollution attacks, and MitM attacks
[65,81,140] and is essential for health care information systems
[2,30]. By authenticating users and resources shared, the origin
of pollution or poisoning attacks can be traced, and the attackers
can be held accountable. Individual PHS providers leveraging
an effective IAS can strengthen security, which has the potential
to increase patients’ intention to use P2P PHSs. In Germany,
the German HTI planned to provide user authentication through
smart cards as a security measure for PHS providers [65,141].
However, the introduction of national HTIs often leads to
ambiguous, expensive, and protracted projects [65,141]. Until
such solutions are widely available, developers of P2P PHSs
should consider the use of other IASs for the secure provision
of PHSs in public networks [65].
Reputation systems are used to determine the trustworthiness
of nodes and to mitigate Sybil, poisoning, pollution, and MitM
attacks [142]. Reputation management for resources being
shared and peers [143] reduces vulnerabilities such as ID stealth
or pseudospoofing [144,145]. TRM techniques can be leveraged
in P2P PHS in any situation where a party misbehaves (eg, by
supplying inappropriate data to a PHS). Patients can report
misbehavior to reputation systems so that it can be reflected in
the reputation of the misbehaving party. Polluted resources can
also be reported and removed if their reputation is too low
[72,73,75,81].
To address the issues of malicious peers, worms, and DDoS
attacks in the network, an intelligent mobile agent–based IDS
can be deployed in strategic locations (eg, at a hospital node in
our proposed P2P PHS architecture, Figure 3; in the DHT
network in decentralized P2P PHSs such as P2P IHE [6,51]; or
at central index servers of centralized PHSs such as the e-toile
PHS [21]) to protect the corresponding subnetworks in P2P
networks. There are prototypes of scalable and decentralized
agent-based IDS that use 3 types of algorithms (heavy, medium,
and light scan algorithms) to detect malicious activities as early
as possible [87,146,147]. Backpropagation neural network
techniques can be used in IDS to reduce the response times and
false alarm rates [148,149]. To improve detection latency and
load balancing, a collaborative IDS uses publish and subscribe
techniques to selectively route evidence of malicious activities
between peers in the network using distributed lookup
mechanisms [150,151]. Worms scan and infect certain ports in
a network. A firewall can be used to monitor, filter, block, and
blacklist them; antivirus and antispyware tools can be leveraged
to remove or quarantine any suspicious file [81]. The DDoS
can be mitigated by limiting the download bandwidth for each
node. Other policies, such as restricting P2P access to verified
directories and scanning each file before opening, can mitigate
the impact of DDoS, malware, and poisoning attacks [97].
We added risk management (step 6) to the guideline for secure
provision of PHSs (Figure 9) to allow for prioritization of
security issues with higher impact and for the efficient use of
available resources [152]. Risk assessment (step 6a) focuses on
the identification and assessment of security issues based on
the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of exploits. The
cost-benefit analysis involves an analysis of the costs associated
with recovering from security breaches. In a situation where
the costs for mitigation are higher than the potential impact of
a security issue, P2P PHS providers may choose to accept some
level of risk.
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Figure 9. Guidelines for provision of the patient-centered health care information system (PHS) while ensuring security.
Limitations
This research focuses on security engineering for P2P PHSs.
Legal issues with respect to health care security management
are beyond the scope of this study. A further limitation of this
study is that P2P PHS is an emerging phenomenon; therefore,
our study does not provide real-world experiments or a review
of past P2P PHS security incidents. Moreover, the bandwidth,
computation, and storage cost analyses of the proposed P2P
infrastructure, how usability and deployability will affect P2P
PHS adoption, and how to handle patient registration with
multiple PHS providers are beyond the scope of this study.
Contributions
Our research provides a foundation for understanding P2P
system architectures and their advantages and disadvantages.
We propose and discuss a federated architecture (Figure 3)
suitable for PHS deployment, which could be adopted by any
P2P PHS provider, such as insurance companies, hospitals, or
other parties who want to implement P2P PHSs while
maintaining security. On the basis of the 3 different archetypical
P2P system architectures, we elicited and reviewed the inherent
security issues and factors promoting the security issues (Table
3). Moreover, we discuss the consequences of the security issues
and apply a severity scoring system (Table 4), signifying the
impact of each security issue for the 3 different architectures of
P2P PHSs—centralized, hybrid, and decentralized—based on
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the CVSS definitions (Multimedia Appendix 2). Although a
comprehensive discussion of security measures to address each
identified security issue is beyond the scope of this study, we
offer an overview of potential security measures that are useful
for maintaining security in P2P PHSs. We also extended a
guideline for the secure provision of PHSs in public networks
(Figure 9) for the P2P PHS context [2].
P2P PHSs (eg, COVID-19 contact tracing systems such as
PEPP-PT [22] or OnePatient [15]) require research from many
perspectives to facilitate widespread use because they are an
emerging phenomenon, pose major security issues (eg, by
requiring patients to manage information security largely by
themselves [65]), and are understudied. Extant research on PHS
security, privacy, and end-user features [2,28-31] focuses on
centralized and DLT-based PHS. Our research serves as an
introduction to P2P PHSs and potential security issues and
countermeasures. From an ethical perspective, our study is of
interest to initiatives aimed at empowering patients to take
ownership of and control access to their health data. P2P PHSs
promote socially desirable design features such as openness,
reduced dependence on platforms, abandonment of data silos,
and secure patient-to-practitioner communication. Given that
the security challenges are appropriately addressed, P2P PHSs
are also promising for simplifying the implementation of data
protection principles (eg, GDPR [8,34]). Secure P2P PHSs will
not only attract more stakeholders but will also be more efficient
in achieving the goals of patient-centered digital ecosystems
[153].
Future Research
Opportunities for future research include improved designs of
security models, such as IAS, TRM, and intelligent mobile
agent–based IDS, to strengthen security. PHSs have other more
safety-related security requirements that should also be
incorporated in their design, such as emergency access and
guardian support. Such features are vital for P2P PHS to
facilitate access in situations where patients are incapacitated.
However, they are also likely to invoke privacy concerns and
data protection challenges, as they require access to sensitive
information without consulting patients. By using reliable and
patient-centered backup options, P2P PHS providers can
integrate identity authentication management in backup servers
to facilitate the replacement of patient credentials in a situation
where they lose access to their credentials (eg, a stolen laptop).
In addition to the development of approaches to improve
education and awareness of patients regarding information
security challenges inherent to the sharing of data with third
parties [8], a questionnaire-based study focusing on other P2P
PHS stakeholders and asking about their security and privacy
concerns with respect to P2P PHSs could yield valuable
contributions. A guideline for the evaluation of P2P PHSs based
on information security standards (eg, ISO 27799:2016) could
also be very useful.
Conclusions
The idea of P2P PHSs to break up barriers among patients,
health care systems, physicians, and other stakeholders is
appealing. From the patients’ perspective, being empowered to
conveniently take ownership of and control access to their health
data through PHS might bring forth a digital ecosystem that
makes patients a more active contributor in their own care and
can streamline health care activities such as receiving and
accurately interpreting laboratory test results. In the United
States, HIPAA [6] specifies that patients have the liberty “to
see and get copies of their records, and request amendments”;
however, the act does not go into detail on appropriate
approaches to give access [3,30,154]. Currently, PHSs use DLT,
P2P technology, or centralized databases for deployment. To
mitigate the impact of security issues in centralized databases
and the lack of fit of DLT with PHS use cases, P2P PHSs
emerged (eg, OnePatient [15], doc.ai brands [7], or COVID-19
proximity tracing systems such as Stoop [24]), which store
health records locally (on any patient edge device such as a
mobile phone, a tablet computer, a desktop computer, etc) under
the control of individual device owners.
The benefits of P2P networks for PHSs include more options
for privacy self-management, autonomous control of
infrastructure, and high availability. However, these advantages
are associated with complications, as patients must also manage
information security largely by themselves. Gartner claims that
costs for remediating security issues would be reduced by 75%
if only 50% of system vulnerabilities were detected and
remediated before production [155]. Building a successful P2P
system that does not result in privacy or security violations for
users is difficult [26] and entails a collective effort that fixes
the remaining problems (eg, absence of a centralized entity to
detect malicious attacks and increased chances of exposing
network traffic patterns) with clear considerations of network
security and ease of use.
The enormous value of health data requires the provision of
security measures to protect PHSs from cyberattacks.
Overcoming security and privacy barriers in P2P PHS is also
important for increasing patients’ intention to use PHSs. PHS
providers and developers should neither ignore the inherent or
past security issues of P2P systems nor be careless about future
ones.
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